Climate and air-quality benefits of a realistic phase-out of fossil fuels by Shindell, D & Smith, CJ
This is a repository copy of Climate and air-quality benefits of a realistic phase-out of fossil
fuels.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/151100/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Shindell, D and Smith, CJ orcid.org/0000-0003-0599-4633 (2019) Climate and air-quality 
benefits of a realistic phase-out of fossil fuels. Nature, 573 (7774). pp. 408-411. ISSN 
0028-0836 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1554-z
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited 2019. This is an 
author produced version of a paper published in Nature. Uploaded in accordance with the 
publisher's self-archiving policy.
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
The harmonized climate and air quality benefits of a realistic phase out of fossil 1 
fuels 2 
 3 
Drew Shindell
1,2*
 and Christopher J. Smith
3
 4 
 5 
1
Nicholas School of the Environment and Duke Global Health Initiative, Duke 6 
University, Durham, NC, USA 7 
2
Porter School of the Environment and Earth Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel 8 
Aviv, Israel 9 
3
Priestley International Centre for Climate, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK 10 
 11 
Fossil fuel combustion produces emissions of the long-lived greenhouse gas carbon 12 
dioxide and short-lived pollutants, including sulphur dioxide, that contribute to 13 
atmospheric aerosol formation
1
. Atmospheric aerosol can cool the climate, masking some 14 
of the warming effect resulting from greenhouse gases emissions
1
. Aerosol particulates 15 
are highly toxic when inhaled, however, leading to millions of premature deaths per 16 
year
2, 3
. Phasing out unabated fossil fuel combustion will thus provide health benefits but 17 
will also reduce aerosol masking of greenhouse gas-induced warming. Given the much 18 
more rapid response of aerosols to emissions changes relative to carbon dioxide, there are 19 
large near-term increases in the magnitude and rate of climate warming in many idealized 20 
studies that typically assume an instantaneous removal of all anthropogenic or fossil fuel-21 
related emissions
1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
. Here we show that more realistic modelling scenarios do not 22 
produce a substantial near-term increase in either the magnitude or rate of warming, and 23 
in fact can lead to a decrease in warming rates within two decades of the start of the fossil 24 
fuel phaseout. Accounting for the time required to transform power generation, industry 25 
and transportation leads to gradually increasing and largely offsetting climate impacts of 26 
carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide, with the rate of warming further slowed by fossil 27 
methane emission reductions. Our results indicate that even the most aggressive plausible 28 
transition to a clean energy society provides benefits for climate change mitigation and 29 
air quality at essentially all decadal to centennial timescales. 30 
  31 
There is a substantial body of literature pointing out that air quality policies, under which 32 
cooling aerosol particles are reduced, can be beneficial for human health but lead to 33 
‘disbenefits’ for climate change
1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
. Such trade-offs clearly exist for some air 34 
quality policies, such as flue gas desulfurization of coal-fired power plants, and studies 35 
have suggested the alarming possibility that warming rates could accelerate from their 36 
current levels of about 0.2 ?C per decade to 0.4 ?Ǥ ? ?C were aerosols alone to be rapidly 37 
removed
5, 10, 11, 12, 13
. The presence of such trade-offs in response to climate policies is less 38 
clear, however. The scientific community has long known that due to the shorter lifetime 39 
(days to weeks) of cooling aerosols relative to long-lived greenhouse gases such as 40 
carbon dioxide (CO2, decades to centuries), cessation of emissions would lead to a near-41 
term pulse of warming. This was illustrated most clearly by the Intergovernmental Panel 42 
on Climate Change (IPCC) in the Frequently Asked Questions to the Working Group I 43 
contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)
14
, which showed that ceasing 44 
anthropogenic emissions would lead to a spike in warming of about half a degree within a 45 
few years, followed by a slow cooling that would require nearly a century to recover to 46 
current temperatures. Many studies over the past two decades have found a similar near-47 
term warming due to removal of anthropogenic aerosols when all aerosol or all 48 
anthropogenic emissions cease
4, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18
. 49 
 50 
Though authors have often framed their work at least in part as an examination of the 51 
geophysical commitment to past emissions, such results have also been widely assumed 52 
to provide an indication of future behavior were there to be dramatic anthropogenic 53 
emission cuts. This has driven a fairly common perception that the broad phasing out of 54 
unabated fossil fuel usage required to meet ambitious climate change mitigation targets 55 
such as the Paris Climate Agreement also leads to trade-offs, with a near-term increase in 56 
both the magnitude and rate of warming as a ‘climate penalty’ (e.g. 57 
https://nationalpost.com/news/world/scrubbing-aerosol-particles-from-the-atmosphere-a-58 
faustian-bargain-study-finds, ref. 
3, 7
). Such a view may come from incomplete 59 
understanding of scientific studies, or from news and social media reaction from which 60 
some may have incorrectly inferred that aerosol removal inevitably leads to accelerated 61 
warming regardless of co-emitted greenhouse gases. This perception has led to 62 
contentious debates in the policy arena, for example during the approval process for the 63 
Summary for Policy Makers of the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C (hereafter SR1.5) 64 
about the role of non-CO2 emissions reductions. Specifically, some countries with high 65 
air pollution burdens pushed for an equal emphasis on the near-term acceleration of 66 
warming that would result if they were to shift away from fossil fuels alongside the 67 
Report’s presentation of the public health benefits. 68 
 69 
We have studied the pathways included in the recently released SR1.5 (ref. 
19
) to 70 
investigate whether such a climate penalty exists in realistic scenarios of the transition to 71 
clean energy as well as in the idealized ‘zero emissions’ studies. We include 42 pathways 72 
classified by the SR1.5 as consistent with 1.5 ?C with no or limited (<0.1 ?C) temporary 73 
overshoot of the target (see Methods). These scenarios are least-cost pathways generated 74 
by models of the energy-economy-land system and include a rapid phaseout of unabated 75 
fossil fuel usage with a median decrease of ~60% by 2050 and 85% by 2100 for all 76 
primary energy and a >90% reduction in usage of fossil fuels for electricity generation by 77 
2050. The speed at which fossil fuels usage is reduced in these models is based on 78 
feasibility assessments of rates of capital turnover, technology switching, socio-economic 79 
limits to technological and behavioral shifts, and the requisite financial flows. Rates of 80 
change in individual sectors are typically at the high end of those in historical precedents, 81 
whereas the scale of the transitions envisioned is substantially larger than any historical 82 
precedent for similar rates of change
20
. In other words, although energy-economy-land 83 
models have sometimes underpredicted the rates of uptake of specific new technologies
21
, 84 
the overall rates of the societal transformation away from fossil fuels in the 1.5 ?C 85 
pathways are likely at the upper end of what could be achieved under very ambitious 86 
policies. Hence these are likely as close to the ‘zero emissions’ case as is practically 87 
possible. These shifts result in rapid and deep cuts in both CO2 and non-CO2 emissions, 88 
with CO2 from fossil sources and sulphur dioxide (SO2, that is largely co-emitted) 89 
decreasing by around 75-85% by 2050 in most scenarios (Figure 1). Some emissions with 90 
large non-fossil sources, such as methane (CH4), do not necessarily decline by such a 91 
large fraction, but typically decrease sharply in the near-term as their fossil portion is 92 
eliminated (Extended Data Fig. 1). 93 
 94 
We evaluate the global mean surface temperature response to these emissions changes 95 
using the FaIR model that incorporates reduced complexity (relative to Earth System 96 
Models) representations of the carbon cycle and the climate system
22, 23
 (see Methods). 97 
Carbon dioxide removal technologies are excluded to highlight the role of emissions 98 
reductions, and some scenarios hence do not stay below 1.5 ?C. Unlike the response to 99 
idealized, instantaneous emissions removals, global mean temperatures in realistic 100 
pathways do not show a near-term spike in warming (Figure 2). Temperatures continue to 101 
increase for at least a decade, and near-term rates of change are highly scenario 102 
dependent, but none exhibit an acceleration of warming to 0.3 ?C decade-1 or higher, and 103 
all show a rapid decline in warming rates starting in the 2020s with rates by 2040 ranging 104 
from negative (cooling) to less than half the current value (Figure 2). 105 
 106 
We unravel the contributions of individual fossil-related emission decreases to projected 107 
temperatures by recalculating changes when holding the fossil portion of individual 108 
pollutant emissions constant at 2018 levels while allowing other emissions to follow their 109 
specified 1.5 ?C pathways (see Methods). The results show the gradual evolution of 110 
temperature responses, with the largest impacts coming from fossil CO2, SO2 and CH4 111 
emissions changes (Figure 3). The pace of change is influenced by the inertia in both the 112 
physical climate system and in the socio-economic systems in which fossil fuels are used. 113 
For CO2, concentrations adjust slowly to emissions changes, leading to a response that is 114 
substantially extended in time in comparison with the response to SO2 given that both are 115 
largely phased out in the first half of the century (Figure 1). However, the response to 116 
CO2 is also clearly visible in the near-term. For SO2, the temperature response is limited 117 
only by the response of the climate system, but the emissions changes are gradual as the 118 
models include the reality that it takes substantial time to transform energy, transportation 119 
and industrial systems under least-cost pathways. Hence roughly 2-3 decades are required 120 
to reach 2/3 of the 2100 temperature response to SO2 changes under these scenarios 121 
despite their assumption of systemic rates of change that are faster and broader than any 122 
historical precedent
20
. This gradual response to aerosol changes in plausible 1.5 ?C 123 
scenarios is consistent with findings using an intermediate complexity model
18
. 124 
 125 
These results differ greatly from the idealized picture of a near-instantaneous response to 126 
the removal of aerosol cooling followed by a slow transition to dominance by the effects 127 
of CO2. In these more plausible cases, the temperature effects of CO2, SO2 and CH4 128 
reductions roughly balance one another through about 2040, after which the cooling 129 
effects of reduced CO2 continue to grow whereas the SO2 reduction-induced warming and 130 
CH4 reduction-induced cooling effects taper off so that CO2 reduction-induced cooling 131 
dominates (Figure 3). Examining the impact of CO2 and SO2 alone (Figure 3d), the faster 132 
response of SO2 means that the net effect of these two pollutants would indeed be a short-133 
term warming, but a very small one of between 0.02 and 0.10 ?C in the ensemble mean 134 
temperature response (up to 0.30 ?C for the 95th percentile across pathways). Accounting 135 
for all fossil-related emissions (Figure 3e), any brief ‘climate penalty’ decreases to no 136 
more than 0.05 ?C (0.19 ?C at the 95th percentile), with the smaller value largely due to the 137 
additional near-term cooling from methane reductions. Nearly all the warming in the 138 
2020s and 2030s (Figure 2) is thus attributable to the impact of the residual emissions 139 
(mainly of CO2) during the gradual fossil phase out as well as response to historical 140 
emissions
17
. 141 
 142 
What explains the difference in our results in comparison with perception of a climate 143 
penalty due to the rapid removal of aerosol cooling? In large part, the difference between 144 
the response times of aerosols and CO2 is smoothed out when both emissions are reduced 145 
gradually compared with idealized zero emissions simulations. Note also that aerosol-146 
cloud interactions are highly non-linear, with a substantial fraction of the forcing 147 
remaining even at low aerosol precursor emissions. In addition, the perception of a 148 
climate penalty may also reflect results from earlier work on transitioning away from 149 
fossil fuels suggesting that the effects of sulfate could substantially outweigh those of 150 
CO2. That was likely true in the past, as the ratio of SO2 to CO2 emissions (in tonnes of 151 
S/C) was ~1/100 in 1980, roughly double the ~1/200 value in 2019 (using SR1.5 scenario 152 
data). This stems from an increase in CO2 emissions of ~70% along with a reduction in 153 
SO2 emissions of ~20% due to air pollution controls in many regions. Hence over the past 154 
40 years, the world’s success in curbing SO2 emissions along with its failure to curb CO2 155 
emissions have led the world to a state where aerosols mask a substantially smaller 156 
portion of the effect of CO2, greatly diminishing any ‘climate penalty’ resulting from 157 
simultaneously phasing out emissions of both pollutants. Prominent analyses showing 158 
that aerosol reductions owing to clean air policies have likely led to observed increases in 159 
warming
24, 25
 and could cause rapid acceleration in future warming
5, 10, 11, 12, 13
 may have 160 
also left such a strong impression that the same is presumed to be the impact of any 161 
future reductions in SO2, even when accompanied by CO2 reductions. Finally, studies 162 
have shown that complete cessation of CO2 emissions leads to fairly constant global 163 
temperatures
15
, which has implied to some that CO2 reductions can be neglected in 164 
determining the climate impact of a fossil-fuel phaseout
7
. On the contrary, when 165 
compared to continued present-day emissions, the phaseout of CO2 is more important 166 
than concurrent air pollution reductions for climate over the long term, and no less 167 
important in the short term (Figure 3). Hence the misperception may stem from 168 
misapplication of idealized cases, failure to account for recent emissions trends, 169 
misconstruing the climate impacts of air quality policies alone to be a good proxy for 170 
phasing out fossil fuels, or a combination of these. 171 
 172 
It is important to point out that our conclusions do not result from different model physics 173 
relative to prior studies. Indeed, an instantaneous removal of SO2 as in prior idealized 174 
studies also leads to a near-term acceleration in warming in our modeling. Extended Data 175 
Fig. 2 shows the temperature difference from zeroed SO2 compared to the original 176 
scenarios where SO2 emissions follow the trajectories in Figure 1b. The magnitude can 177 
vary depending upon the assumed climate sensitivity and aerosol forcing, but only the 178 
latter could affect our conclusions markedly as changes in the climate sensitivity would 179 
similarly impact the response to other emissions
17
. Based on an analysis of geophysical 180 
uncertainties associated with both aerosol forcing and climate sensitivity, we find that 181 
any climate penalty associated with the rapid phaseout of fossil fuel usage envisioned in 182 
the SR1.5 pathways is likely to be at most 0.29°C. Such a large penalty can happen if 183 
both climate sensitivity and present-day aerosol forcing are at the 95
th
 percentile of their 184 
AR5-assessed uncertainty ranges, and is also pathway dependent (Extended Data Fig. 3). 185 
This is a somewhat extreme case, implying very rapid present-day and near-future 186 
warming (though consistent with historical observations; see Extended Data Fig. 4). 187 
  188 
Overall, we find that the success of air quality controls implemented over the past few 189 
decades in reducing SO2 emissions at the global scale along with the continued growth in 190 
CO2 emissions has substantially changed the balance between the effects of present-day 191 
emissions of these two pollutants on climate in the near-term. Therefore, gradually 192 
phasing out the unabated fossil fuel combustion that is the primary source of these two 193 
emissions in a very ambitious but plausible manner leads to relatively minimal change in 194 
the near future warming. A slower phaseout of fossil fuel use would allow more time for 195 
CO2 concentrations to adjust to CO2 emissions reductions at a given level of reduced 196 
aerosol masking, thus shifting the net impact even further away from accelerated 197 
warming in the near-term, but with a higher level of eventual peak warming
17
. A ‘climate 198 
penalty’ could occur were air pollution controls to be put in place while greenhouse gas 199 
emissions were allowed to continue to increase, as many studies have shown
5, 10, 11, 12, 13
. 200 
The apparent success of ongoing efforts to reduce air pollution in places such as China
26
 201 
thus adds to the urgency to phase out fossil fuel usage.  202 
 203 
It is well-established that the reduction of SO2 and other short-lived pollutants 204 
accompanying a shift to clean energy leads to enormous public health benefits, saving 205 
millions of lives per year
3, 19, 27, 28
 and providing health and productivity gains leading to 206 
overall welfare benefits valued in the trillions of dollars annually
29, 30
. Given those health 207 
improvements, and that the net climate impact is a reduction in warming rates beginning 208 
in the 2030s (Figure 3) and is thus also beneficial, we suggest that there is no evidence 209 
for a conflict between climate and air quality goals in the case of a worldwide transition 210 
to clean energy. 211 
 212 
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Figure Legends 361 
 362 
Figure 1. Anthropogenic emissions in 1.5°C pathways with low or no overshoot 363 
considered in SR1.5. (a) Fossil-related emissions are shown for CO2 (along with a 364 
minimal non-fossil industrial source) to separate those from other sources (primarily 365 
land-use) and from carbon dioxide removal technologies, whereas emissions from all 366 
sources are shown for (b) SO2 and (c) CH4 to highlight how the fractional reduction 367 
depends upon whether emissions are heavily dominated by fossil fuel use (SO2) or have 368 
substantial non-fossil sources (CH4). The legend for all figures is presented in Extended 369 
Data Fig. 9. 370 
 371 
Figure 2. Global mean surface temperatures and warming rates in the 1.5°C 372 
pathways with low or no overshoot. (a) Global mean surface temperatures (relative to 373 
preindustrial) are shown accounting for all changes except carbon dioxide removal 374 
technologies and (b) annual rates of warming in those pathways as computed with the 375 
FaIR climate model emulator. Each line represents the ensemble mean result for a 376 
specific 1.5 ?C pathway. 377 
 378 
Figure 3. Global mean surface temperature response to changes in fossil fuel-related 379 
emissions. Response are shown for (a) CO2 only, (b) SO2 only, (c) CH4 only, (d) both 380 
CO2 and SO2 and (e) all pollutants relative to 2019 in the 1.5 ?C pathways with low or no 381 
overshoot (other emissions lead to changes of less than 0.07 ?C by 2100, so are not shown 382 
individually). Solid lines show ensemble means; shaded regions show 5
th
 to 95
th
 383 
percentile temperature responses across the ensemble in each scenario. 384 
  385 
Methods 386 
 387 
Emissions 388 
The starting point of our analysis is the 42 scenarios from the “below 1.5°C” and “1.5°C 389 
low overshoot” categories from Chapter 2 in SR1.5 (ref. 
19
) and also available on the 390 
IAMC Scenario Explorer
31, 32
. This set of pathways results from screening all 53 potential 391 
pathways to include those that also reported Kyoto greenhouse gas emissions in 2010, the 392 
last year the scenarios are intended to capture historical emissions, within the range 393 
determined to be valid based on prior IPCC evaluation
33
. All scenarios provide separate 394 
energy and land-use related CO2 emissions. For CO2, the scenarios report total emissions 395 
from energy and industrial processes. Negative emissions associated with BECCS and 396 
enhanced weathering have been removed to highlight the role of fossil fuel emissions 397 
cuts. Non-fossil contributions within industry are <4% of the total
34
, so we use this to 398 
represent fossil-related emissions. From the 42 pathways, 17 provide information on the 399 
proportion of emissions of non-CO2 fossil-related forcers that relate to agriculture, 400 
forestry and other land use (AFOLU) which are not fossil emissions. Some scenarios also 401 
provide an “other” category for emissions that are non-fossil and non-AFOLU, but there 402 
is little consistency in the proportion of these emissions to the total, so they have been 403 
treated as fossil emissions, with the exception of methane. Results are insensitive to this 404 
categorization choice for non-CO2 emissions. For methane, the 17 models provide energy 405 
sector emissions and we use these rather than the difference of total and AFOLU, noting 406 
that there are substantial sources of methane that are non-fossil and non-AFOLU (e.g. 407 
waste). This treatment of methane is a conservative assumption as it decreases the 408 
difference between the fossil-fuel phase out and constant-emissions scenarios. The time-409 
varying fossil fuel fraction is calculated from the scenarios containing this data (Extended 410 
Data Fig. 1). The mean of these scenario fractions is applied to all scenarios to generate 411 
an assumed fossil fuel fraction for emissions other than CO2. Applying the scenario 412 
specific values, were those available for all 42 scenarios, would have minimal effect as 413 
either the fossil fraction varies little across scenarios (e.g. SO2) or the impacts are small 414 
(e.g. organic carbon (OC)), except for methane in which case the uncertainty range would 415 
be larger.  416 
 417 
There are additional indirect emissions changes due to substitution of other fuels to 418 
replace fossil fuels. In particular, extensive use of biofuels leads to increased N2O in a 419 
few scenarios, but only late in the century and only in those with the greatest usage of 420 
biofuel energy with carbon capture and storage. In most pathways, fossil fuel demand is 421 
substituted for renewables, efficiency and demand management, with increased use of 422 
nuclear power in some scenarios, all of which do not lead to indirect emissions. Hence 423 
any influence of indirect emissions is expected to be very small.  424 
 425 
For scenarios where we assess constant 2018 emissions into the future, we apply the 426 
constant emissions assumption to the fossil component of the emissions only, allowing 427 
the non-fossil component to vary based on the scenario-mean non-fossil fraction of total 428 
emissions from the base scenario. We examine the impacts of future changes (post-2018) 429 
rather than changes throughout the entire scenario (post-2010) to provide more relevant 430 
information to inform policy making. 431 
 432 
Modeling Climate Response 433 
Our scenario pathways are run in the Finite Amplitude Impulse Response (FaIR) simple 434 
climate model (v1.3.6; refs. 
22, 23
) using a 1000 member perturbed parameter ensemble. 435 
FaIR converts emissions of greenhouse gases and short-lived climate forcers into an 436 
effective radiative forcing (ERF; see Extended Data Fig. 5), and from this to a 437 
temperature anomaly, via an intermediate concentration step for greenhouse gases and 438 
simplified carbon cycle representation for CO2. The atmospheric concentrations of CO2 439 
are determined using the four time-constant impulse response model in AR5 with an 440 
adjustment to the time constants of CO2 uptake for cumulative emissions and 441 
temperature. The recent trend in airborne fraction of CO2 and simulated atmospheric CO2 442 
concentrations in FaIR agree very well with observations (Extended Data Fig. 6). For 443 
completeness, in addition to the influence of the fossil fuel phaseout relative to constant 444 
fossil emissions shown in Figures 3 and Extended Data Fig. 5, the behavior of CO2 and 445 
temperature response to CO2 relative to present-day values is also presented (Extended 446 
Data Fig. 7; ERF follows concentrations). In this study, we do not consider natural 447 
forcing for projections, consistent with both SR1.5 and prior FaIR modeling
17
. The base 448 
scenarios in this paper are the FaIR results presented in SR1.5 (ref. 
19
). 449 
 450 
The perturbed parameter ensemble samples the uncertainty in equilibrium climate 451 
sensitivity (ECS), transient climate response (TCR), strength of the ERF for 11 groups of 452 
anthropogenic forcing agents, pre-industrial airborne fraction of a pulse emission of CO2, 453 
and the strength of carbon cycle feedbacks due to temperature and cumulative carbon 454 
emissions. ECS and TCR distributions are informed by CMIP5 model results from abrupt 455 
4xCO2 and 1% per year CO2 experiments
35
. ERF uncertainty is applied by using the AR5 456 
assessed distributions for each forcing category (well mixed greenhouse gases, aerosols, 457 
tropospheric ozone, and several other minor anthropogenic forcings)
1
 except for methane 458 
for which the uncertainty in forcing has recently been revised
36
. Aerosol forcing is 459 
comprised of both direct and indirect effects. The direct effect scales linearly with 460 
emissions of aerosol precursor species, with the coefficients based on radiative 461 
efficiencies from the Aerocom project
37
. The indirect component is calculated from a 462 
logarithmic relationship of forcing to emissions of SO2, BC and OC, that is fit to an 463 
emulation of the Community Atmosphere Model (CAM5)
38
. The direct and indirect 464 
effects are scaled to the best estimate of ERF from aerosol-radiation interactions (ERFari) 465 
and aerosol-cloud interactions (ERFaci) respectively, from AR5 (scaling is applied 466 
uniformly across aerosol species). The carbon cycle is represented using a simple fit to 467 
the behavior of earth system models of full and intermediate complexity
39
 with a state-468 
dependent increase in airborne fraction based on cumulative CO2 emissions and 469 
temperature anomaly since pre-industrial
23
. In FaIR, this is represented by scaling the 470 
four time constants of atmospheric CO2 decay. 471 
 472 
The 1000 member ensemble for each scenario is constrained based on whether individual 473 
ensemble members replicate the gradient of observed warming, including observational 474 
uncertainty and accounting for the autocorrelation from internal variability
40
, from the 475 
mean of the HadCRUT4, GISTEMP and NOAA observational datasets from 1880 to 476 
2014, of 0.90 ± 0.19°C (refs. 
41, 42, 43
). In applying the historical constraint we use the 477 
same parameter draws but do include historical solar and volcanic forcing, as in SR1.5. 478 
2014 is used as the end date for the historical constraining as the CMIP6 historical 479 
volcanic time series ends in 2014. This procedure retains between 323 and 325 ensemble 480 
members depending on the scenario. The differences are a result of slightly different 481 
emissions pathways from 2010 in each scenario. 482 
 483 
In Figure 2a we show the ensemble mean temperature projections from FaIR, which are 484 
substantially lower than those projected from the more established Model for the 485 
Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC; ref. 
44
) for the same 486 
scenarios. The temperature projections from MAGICC define the scenario classifications 487 
in SR1.5. Much of the differences between the models can be explained by the parameter 488 
setups, with MAGICC having a higher mean TCR and stronger near-present day aerosol 489 
forcing than FaIR
19
, and higher airborne fraction of CO2, leading to a greater rate of 490 
warming in the present and in the near future in MAGICC compared to FaIR
45
. Extended 491 
Data Fig. 4 shows that a much greater rate of near-term temperature change in FaIR that 492 
is still consistent with historical observations can be projected with a high TCR and 493 
stronger present-day aerosol forcing. 494 
 495 
To assess the geophysical uncertainty we use the 5
th
 percentile and 95
th
 percentile of the 496 
temperatures output from the constrained ensemble for each scenario. In each case the 497 
95
th
 (or 5
th
) percentile of the constant fossil fuel emissions run is subtracted from the 95
th
 498 
or 5
th
 percentile of the original scenario (because the same geophysical conditions would 499 
apply in both the constant emission and base SR1.5 scenario pathways). In Extended 500 
Data Figs. 3 and 4 we also analyse a situation where we run one ensemble member per 501 
scenario with a TCR, ECS and aerosol forcing that approximately corresponds to the 95
th
 502 
percentile of these values from AR5 (2.7°C, 6.0°C and -1.9 W/m
2
 respectively) with all 503 
other geophysical variables left at their default values. The 95
th
 percentiles were not 504 
defined in terms of a distribution for ECS and TCR in AR5. The “likely” range (> 66%) 505 
for TCR of 1.0 to 2.5°C implies at least a 17
th
 to 83
rd
 percentile range, with a TCR 506 
exceeding 3.0°C deemed to be “extremely unlikely” (< 5%). Hence the 95
th
 percentile of 507 
TCR is constrained to lie at or below 3.0°C and is probably above 2.5°C. We choose 508 
2.7°C for consistency with the upper ranges of the observed historical temperature 509 
change (Extended Data Fig. 3). The ECS is only “unlikely” (< 10%) to exceed 6.0°C, but 510 
we choose 6.0°C to give a TCR/ECS ratio of 0.45. Using a higher ECS gives a smaller 511 
TCR/ECS ratio, and 0.45 is towards the lower end of the range of CMIP5 models
46
. It 512 
should be stressed that TCR is more important for historical and near-future climate 513 
change than ECS
47
 and our results are insensitive to any sensible choice of ECS. Such a 514 
configuration, while extreme, does produce results consistent with historical temperature 515 
observations, however (Extended Data Fig. 4). In these 95
th
 percentile runs, we observe a 516 
climate penalty of between 0.07 and 0.29°C, depending on the scenario (Extended Data 517 
Fig. 3). 518 
 519 
We note that although this study focuses on the effects of fossil-fuel related emissions, 520 
accounting for the effects of reductions in greenhouse gases from non-fossil sources, 521 
including fluorinated gases and both methane and nitrous oxide from agriculture, along 522 
with biofuels that are a large source of warming BC, could eliminate any near-term 523 
penalty entirely. In fact, given that the net effect of the fossil fuel phaseout on 524 
temperature is minimal during the first 20 years (Figure 3), reducing those other 525 
pollutants is the only plausible way to decrease warming during that period. 526 
 527 
This study examines the effects of a global phaseout of fossil fuel use. If the transition is 528 
not global but regional, the effects could differ although such scenarios would not be able 529 
to achieve the 1.5 ?C target. In the most extreme case, were just one region to undertake a 530 
phaseout of fossil fuel use, that region could indeed experience larger local disbenefits for 531 
climate as nearly all the positive reduction in SO2 forcing would be localized there 532 
whereas the negative CO2 forcing would be spread out globally. This type of result has 533 
been seen in detailed modeling with general circulation models (GCMs) (e.g. 
48
). Such 534 
effects would be ameliorated by action to phase out fossil fuels in multiple regions, 535 
however. 536 
 537 
More generally, it is difficult to compare our results with those from GCMs as the latter 538 
have not yet explored the effects of 1.5 ?C scenarios relative to baseline emissions. The 539 
closest analogue from a GCM are results using the GISS-E2R climate model examining a 540 
faster phase out of fossil fuel usage to achieve 1.5 ?C rather than 2 ?C. Those found that 541 
negative radiative forcing due to reduced CO2 and reduced ozone (owing to decreases in 542 
emissions of precursors such as NOx and CO) largely offset positive forcing due to 543 
reductions in cooling aerosols and a slight increase in methane, so that net forcing was 544 
less than 0.03 W m
-2
 through 2060 in their simulations
28
. Those results differ in their 545 
impact of methane (increasing in those scenarios whereas decreasing in the scenarios 546 
examined here) as the 2 ?C reference scenario used in that study already incorporated all 547 
the methane reductions included in the 1.5 ?C scenarios, hence the only additional impact 548 
was a small chemical response in which methane’s lifetime increased due to reductions in 549 
NOx emissions. The overall finding of a minimal climate penalty in those GCM 550 
simulations seems to be qualitatively consistent with the results from the simple climate 551 
model (FaIR) used in this work. 552 
 553 
Radiative Forcing and Methane 554 
As noted previously, FaIR converts emissions of greenhouse gases and short-lived 555 
climate forcers into an effective radiative forcing (ERF). The ERF values in FaIR are 556 
consistent with those in the IPCC AR5, other than for methane (see next paragraph), and 557 
the perturbed parameter ensemble accounts for the full range of uncertainty in each 558 
forcing component as evaluated in AR5. Differences in forcing trajectories due to fossil 559 
fuel related emissions are shown in Extended Data Fig. 5. 560 
 561 
For methane, this study uses a recently published update to the radiative efficiency
34
. The 562 
update incorporated revisions to spectroscopic databases since the 1998 parameterization 563 
that was the basis for the AR5 relationship, and most importantly included shortwave 564 
absorption of methane which was previously not included. This leads to an increase in the 565 
total radiative forcing of methane by about 25%. However, as this increase is applied 566 
consistently to both historical and future methane, it has negligible impact on the 567 
conclusions reported here (e.g. 2040 temperatures would differ by ~0.01°C; Extended 568 
Data Fig. 8). 569 
 570 
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Extended Data Fig. 1. Fraction of total emissions due to fossil fuels. Emissions are 574 
shown for each of the 17 scenarios where data were provided (grey lines) along with the 575 
scenario mean (thick black line) values used in this study for the indicated components. 576 577 
Extended Data Fig. 2. Temperature responses for zero anthropogenic SO2 emissions 578 
from 2019 minus the original scenarios. Differences between ensemble means from 579 
each scenario (solid lines) and 5
th
 to 95
th
 percentile regions spanning all scenarios (shaded 580 
area) are shown. This thus presents the impact of an instantaneous removal relative to the 581 
gradual removal in the 1.5°C scenarios rather than relative to constant present-day 582 
emissions. 583 
 584 
Extended Data Fig. 3. 95
th
 percentile sensitivity calculations of global mean surface 585 
temperature response to changes in all fossil fuel-related emissions. Values are as in 586 
Figure 3e but for FaIR calculations using the 95
th
 percentile of ECS, TCR and aerosol 587 
forcing simultaneously. Lines show ensemble means for 1.5 ?C scenarios minus constant 588 
2018 fossil fuel emissions. 589 590 
Extended Data Fig. 4. Sensitivity of historical and projected surface temperatures to 591 
geophysical uncertainties. Global mean surface temperature response to historical and 592 
projected emissions are shown using both ensemble mean (dashed lines) and the 95
th
 593 
percentile geophysical setup for ECS, TCR and aerosol forcing simultaneously (solid 594 
lines). The historical observations from Cowtan & Way
49
, HadCRUT4
39
, GISS 595 
(GISTEMP)
40
, NOAA
41
 and Berkeley Earth
50
 are shown for comparison. 596 
 597 
Extended Data Fig. 5. Global mean effective radiative forcing due to changes in fossil 598 
fuel-related emissions. Global mean annual average effective radiative forcing 599 
differences between the mitigation and constant emissions scenarios shown in Figure 3 600 
are presented. 601 
 602 
Extended Data Fig. 6. Instantaneous airborne fraction of CO2. Values derived from 603 
observations and in the FaIR model are shown. 604 
 605 
Extended Data Fig. 7. Impact of projected changes in CO2. (a) Global mean surface 606 
temperature response to changes in CO2 relative to the present-day and (b) the associated 607 
ERF. 608 
 609 
Extended Data Fig. 8. Sensitivity to updated radiative forcing from methane. Global 610 
mean surface temperature response to changes in fossil fuel-related methane emissions 611 
and in all fossil fuel-related emissions as in Figures 3c and 3e (top) but comparing against 612 
sensitivity calculations using the AR5 estimate of methane forcing (bottom) rather than 613 
the updated radiative efficiency accounting for shortwave absorption
33
 used throughout 614 
the rest of this study. 615 
 616 
Extended Data Fig. 9. Caption for all scenarios shown in other figures. Colors go from 617 
dark to light in ascending order of peak temperature. 618 619 
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